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Introduction
Global interest in and attention to forests have grown as concerns about
global warming and climate change have taken a heightened position
in international policy debates. Forests have been repositioned in inter-
national arenas as repositories of global value for their contribution to
carbon sequestration and climate mitigation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003;
Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2011). In this context, Latin American forests
are seen as globally important in ﬁghting climate change.
Carbon emissions in developing countries, particularly in Latin
America, are related mostly to land-use and land-cover change. In Latin
America, energy accounts for only 28% of regional emissions, whereas
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) accounts for 67%
(Barcena et al., 2010). Forests cover about 11.1 million km2 and savan-
nahs 3.3 million km2, comprising several different types of vegetation.
The region as a whole has the world’s greatest forest loss (Pacheco
et al., 2010). Most of the forest conversion in Latin America occurs in
the Amazon basin. Some countries are already being pressed to reduce
emissions related to land-cover change, particularly deforestation. Polit-
ical pressure comes from the international arena in many forms and is
exerted by several actors: sovereign states, international organizations,
media, civil society networks and others.
Several Latin American governments have turned to climate poli-
cies as an opportunity to improve environmental governance. Current
discussions focus on a set of policies known as REDD in developing
countries plus carbon-sequestering forest activities. REDD was originally
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designed as a payment for environmental services – that is, a volun-
tary transaction where a well-deﬁned service (or a land-use system likely
to secure that service) is being “bought by a buyer from a provider, if
and only if the provider secures the service provision” (Wunder, 2005).
REDD is based on the idea that it is possible to reduce deforestation by
offering economic compensation to forest users for not changing the
use of forestlands. It is seen as a win–win approach that would poten-
tially address the trade-offs between forest conservation and economic
development. Some analysts claim that REDD projects have the poten-
tial to generate enough money to end deforestation in tropical countries
(Nepstad et al., 2009).
Although originally presented as an “apolitical” technological ﬁx
(cf. Li, 2007), REDD has encountered much criticism, and early propos-
als faced ﬁerce political resistance. The neoliberal idea of the commodi-
ﬁcation of nature seemed repellent to individuals and even to countries,
which fear that developed countries would use their economic power
to increase or leave unaddressed their carbon emissions at the expense
of developing countries. There were also fears that REDD would bene-
ﬁt actors who have historically been responsible for deforestation, such
as ranchers and large-scale farmers, while excluding the less privileged
forest-dwellers, who cannot bear the transaction costs of carbon mar-
kets and do not even have the title to their lands (Boyd, Gutierrez and
Chang, 2007; Blom, Sunderland and Murdiyarso, 2010).
REDD proved to be much more complex than a simple carbon-market
arrangement. Since it is a project “in the making”, it necessarily leaves
room for bargaining and negotiations as to how forest and climate poli-
cies will take shape in speciﬁc contexts. As a result, REDD quickly moved
from strictly carbon storage to having multiple objectives, including
biodiversity conservation and the enhancement of local livelihoods
(Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). This even more complex mechanism is
not yet settled. There are important struggles at international, national
and local levels to deﬁne how REDD should be implemented.
REDD can be seen as a multilevel project of environmental gover-
nance. By environmental governance we mean “a set of mechanisms,
formal and informal institutions and practices by way of which social
order is produced through controlling that which is related to the envi-
ronment and natural resources” (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015: 5). Some
decisions regarding REDD are taken at the global level, other decisions
are taken at the national level and ﬁnally actions, projects and initia-
tives are implemented at the local level. This complexity might result in
the hybridization of REDD, and, as the idea is appropriated by different
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actors, such hybridization might also result in subtle or open power
struggles among actors at the different levels.
REDD emerged as a global initiative from the climate negotiations,
but it is going to be implemented in countries with very different
approaches to combating deforestation, technical capacity, institutional
and political settings, levels of decentralization of forest governance,
budgets and so forth. Therefore it is possible to expect REDD to unfold
in quite different ways across the region. To understand and analyse the
diversity in which REDD is evolving in Latin America, in this chapter
our analytical focus will move across different scales and will make use
of some paradigmatic examples, with special emphasis on the coun-
tries representing such cases. Our analysis will show that despite their
initial opposition, some groups of actors support REDD and are taking
advantage of the new opportunities that the scheme offers. REDD ini-
tiatives, for example, have become an economic opportunity for both
state and national governments as well as for international and regional
environmental NGOs.
This chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, we
present our main analytical argument. The following section examines
the phased approach to implement REDD in Latin America. In the third
section, we present what we have identiﬁed as three general strategies to
implement and shape REDD across the region. In the next section, we
discuss some examples of how pilot projects are taking off in the region.
Finally, we present our conclusions.
Hybrid environmental governance and REDD
Forests in Latin America are territories where several conﬂictive interests
meet. However, there is no consensus on the conceptualization of the
causes and consequences of deforestation. Diverse conceptualizations of
deforestation are closely related to claims over forest management and
over resources (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). Forests are socially, culturally,
ecologically, economically and symbolically valuable to different actors,
including indigenous peoples, local users, governments, corporations,
illegal cartels, NGOs, nations and the globe, albeit in different ways and
for different reasons (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). All these actors have
different potentials to exert power and access arenas to inﬂuence REDD-
related policy-making.
The very notion of “environmental governance” implies that there
is some sort of hybridity in terms of the actors, and in the mecha-
nisms and practices it involves. This means that both public and private
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actors participate on various scales, in producing models and frames for
governance. By focusing on REDD we pay attention to emergent gover-
nance arrangements that include state actors, subnational governments,
multilateral institutions, scientists, NGOs and business (Karkkainen,
2004).
The conceptualization of REDD, its formulation, negotiation and
implementation involve a range of actors because the necessary
resources for such tasks are not controlled by a single entity. As our anal-
ysis will suggest, these resources function as sources of legitimacy for the
participation of different actors in REDD. By legitimacy, we mean who is
making “the rules of the game” in REDD preparations and negotiations.
We see legitimacy as a source of power to create and support certain poli-
cies and practices, while simultaneously hindering others. Legitimacy
rests, among other things, on the shared acceptance of rules by differ-
ent groups of actors with shared interests on the issue to be governed
(Bernstein, 2004).
REDD, however, is still a project “in the making”. Because of that, this
chapter only aims to examine two processes: (1) how different countries
engage with REDD; and (2) how different actors within these countries
get involved in a range of activities seen as necessary for the future
implementation of REDD on the ground. In other words, our analy-
sis will not focus on the outcomes of the REDD initiative because such
outcomes are still uncertain.
Our proposition in this chapter is that REDD as a concept has been
“black-boxed” (Latour, 1987; Forsyth, 2003; Goldman, Nadasdy and
Turner, 2011). By that we mean that those engaged in REDD do not
consider it necessary to further discuss or question what REDD means.
This does not imply, however, that there are no other actors – who
perhaps are not directly involved in REDD negotiations – who actu-
ally question and challenge the initiative. REDD policy-making reﬂects
how different interests are negotiated between different actors on vari-
ous geographical scales. In this chapter we will argue that a “distortion”
of REDD – from a simple market mechanism to a complex multistake-
holder, contested political processes – is one of the ways that the idea
gets wide support from a range of actors and makes the hybridization we
refer to above possible. REDD as a concept is broad and vague enough
to permit different interpretations that would ﬁt the goals of different
actors (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). This has allowed countries in Latin
America to pursue different paths regarding the emphasis given to how
to ﬁnance REDD (fund based or carbon markets) and what issues should
be addressed before REDD actions are implemented.
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To support our proposition we discuss three different strategies used
by Latin American countries to engage or resist the REDD initiative.
Also, the “distortion” works at more local levels by allowing different
actors to get involved in planning activities. We will also discuss plan-
ning activities in the Amazon region to support our proposition and
will show how there are some key resources that galvanize the participa-
tion of certain actors in REDD preparations. By key resources, we mean
resources that can be “traded” to gain legitimacy to participate in REDD
processes at local levels. As we will show below, access to networks and
knowledge production are among such key resources.
REDD in Latin America and the phased approach
In 2010, during the conference of the parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), governments
agreed to adopt a phased approach for REDD. The idea of a phased
approach came from a report (Angelsen et al. 2009) prepared by the
Meridian Institute for the Government of Norway. The idea put for-
ward by the report by Angelsen et al. (2009) was adopted by the UNFCC
Cancun agreement1 (Agrawal, Nepstad and Chhatre, 2011). The Cancun
agreement stipulates that countries participating in REDD should imple-
ment activities by phases. These phases are (1) development of national
REDD strategy plans and capacity-building; (2) implementation of
national plan and demonstration activities; and (3) results-based actions
with full measuring, reporting and veriﬁcation. So far, most Latin
American countries involved in REDD are in Phase 1. Guyana is in Phase
1 but has already received funding from Norway that would correspond
to phases 2 and 3; Brazil is in Phase 2, entering Phase 3 (Figure 8.1).
There are many mechanisms for ﬁnancing Phase 1, including pub-
lic funds from the countries implementing REDD or from donors:
the Forest Investment Programme supported by the Climate Invest-
ment (Multilateral Investment Banks), the UN-REDD programme, and
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank.
The latter two are the main sources of funding, and some countries
such as Bolivia,2 Peru and Ecuador have applied to both. On the
other hand, Brazil established its own Amazon Fund in 2008, through
which reduced deforestation is going to be ﬁnanced in the coun-
try. Guyana established the Guyana REDD investment fund (GRIF) in
2010 as part of a cooperation agreement with Norway in the frame-
work of the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) of Guyana.3
The LCDS of Guyana was prepared by the consultancy ﬁrm McKinsey,
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Figure 8.1 Latin American countries in relation to their participation in REDD
and the phased approach
and Guyana’s president embarked upon an international campaign to
attract funding for the initiative. Venezuela and French Guyana do not
participate in any REDD initiatives under the United Nations or the
World Bank.
In 2013, Norway was the single major ﬁnancial contributor to the
UN-REDD Programme, FCPF, the Brazilian Amazon Fund and the GRIF.
Norway contributes 82% of the total budget of the UN-REDD Pro-
gramme, 44% of the total budget of FCPF, 87% of the total budget of the
Amazon Fund, and 100% of the GRIF.4 The country is one of the major
players in deﬁning REDD at the global level and has some inﬂuence on
the way in which REDD is advancing at national levels.
The incorporation of the phased approach launched by the Meridian
report in the UNFCC’s Cancun agreement contributes to stressing a
particular way of prioritizing the activities necessary for the implemen-
tation of REDD. This particular approach is being reproduced in national
contexts because its proponents believe in the technical superiority of
the approach and because it promotes comparability and compatibil-
ity between countries, but not necessarily a solution to the problem
of deforestation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). As it might seem obvi-
ous to most, the driving forces behind deforestation vary enormously,
as do the political and economic settings in each country, the inter-
ests and alliances among different actors, and the roles played by the
state and non-state actors. The challenges associated with deforestation
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in the region are as political as technical, but the phased approach
de-emphasizes other dimensions of the problem.
In the phased approach, institutional arrangements and technical
capacity to measure deforestation are emphasized. REDD will rely on
the speciﬁc target of measuring reduced emissions from deforestation.
In Latin America, in addition to Brazil, only Mexico and Costa Rica have
comparable technical capacity in place to measure forest-cover change.
Consequently, a strong emphasis in readiness preparations in all other
countries in Latin America is currently placed on strengthening tech-
nical infrastructure to monitor forest change.5 A strong emphasis on
measuring and monitoring forest cover has a depoliticizing effect on
the understanding of deforestation’s causes, consequences and risks to
impose control mechanisms that might harm local livelihoods (Scott,
1998). If the causes and consequences of deforestation are not properly
understood in each country, it might be that those who live closer to
forested areas bear the blame for deforestation and the responsibility for
avoiding it.
The three REDD strategies in Latin America
Several Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela) have been sceptical about offsets from carbon emissions trad-
ing, as declared by the countries at the BASIC Ministerial Meeting on
Climate Change in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, in September 2013.6 The min-
isters called for environmental integrity and stressed that “results-based
payments shall not be used to offset mitigation commitments by Annex
I countries [industrialized countries]”. The ALBA7 countries have held
the same position.
Although the ideas that led to the intellectual elaboration of REDD
in part emerged in Brazil (Santilli et al., 2005), the country opposed
any attempts to include forests and deforestation under the scope of
the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanisms. Without Brazil, any such
mechanism would be doomed to fail, considering the magnitude of
the country’s tropical forests and its rate of deforestation. It is argued
that, because of the long history of early initiatives to conserve forests
in the region, Latin American countries are in the lead of early efforts to
implement REDD (Hall, 2011).
Governments in Latin America have taken different approaches to
implement and shape REDD efforts. We have identiﬁed three strategies.
The ﬁrst, which we will refer to as the “assertive strategy”, is character-
ized by efforts made by the central government to frame REDD within
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an existing or emerging forest-climate policy framework. Brazil, Mexico
and Guyana, for example, are employing this strategy. Countries fol-
lowing guidelines or directions decided at the global level and efforts
to accommodate such guidelines in the national context characterize
the second strategy, which we will call the “accommodating strategy”.
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Suriname are pursuing this strat-
egy. Open opposition to certain aspects of REDD or a lack of initiative
to implement REDD characterize the third and last strategy, which we
will call the “resisting strategy”. The countries following this path are
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela and French Guyana. In the paragraphs
below we will use one or two countries to illustrate each of the strate-
gies. First we present the assertive strategy because this represents one
pole in the continuum between taking the lead and resisting a project.
Next we present the accommodating strategy, which represents the situ-
ation of most Latin American countries and thus represents the middle
ground of the continuum. We ﬁnish with the resisting strategy at the
other end of the continuum.
The assertive strategy: Brazil
While most other countries in Latin America were still working to put
human capacity in place to deal with REDD within their ministries of
the environment, Brazil launched the Amazon Fund in 2008. This, how-
ever, represents the way in which the position of Brazil evolved from
resistance to leadership.
For many years the Brazilian Government was a ﬁerce opponent
of any attempts to include forest- and land-use change in the inter-
national negotiations to reduce carbon emissions. This position was
justiﬁed on the grounds that developed and developing countries share
common but differentiated responsibilities concerning global warming.
Many opponents of such proposals were afraid that carbon credits would
allow rich countries to keep pouring carbon into the atmosphere at
the expense of developing countries. Furthermore, Brazil was concerned
with any potential threats to its sovereignty and control of its forests
resources, particularly in the Amazon. Any clause addressing deforesta-
tion could be interpreted as an obstacle to developing the region as the
state saw ﬁt.
Even though President Lula himself supported this realist view, as he
made clear in 2007 during the opening of the UN General Assembly
(Hall, 2008), change in the Brazilian position came from within the
government. When President Lula took ofﬁce in 2003, he appointed
Marina Silva, a former senator and rubber tapper leader, as minister of
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the environment. She promoted some institutional changes that ulti-
mately led to a turnaround in the Brazilian ofﬁcial position. The ﬁrst
change came by opening up new opportunities for participation of civil
society organizations in policy-making. Knowledge networks formed by
activists and scientists developed stronger ties with government ofﬁcials
and became more inﬂuential. A related second change was an adminis-
trative reform in the Ministry of the Environment. In 2007, Silva created
the Secretariat of Climate Change and Environmental Quality, whose
top ofﬁcials were committed to the creation of carbon compensation
mechanisms.
Activists and scientists had been discussing proposals to create com-
pensation mechanisms to pay for avoided deforestation since the early
2000s (Santilli et al., 2005). By the time their peers ascended to the
new secretariat, the government’s efforts to control deforestation were
already paying off. Therefore the idea of being compensated by reducing
deforestation made much more sense to government ofﬁcials.
Another crucial component of the policy network supporting com-
pensation was Amazonian state governments. As proposals evolved
towards compensating carbon stocks, governors saw an opportunity to
channel resources into their states, particularly where there are vast
areas under protection. Protected Areas (PAs) have traditionally been
considered a burden for state and municipal governments. The beneﬁts
of conservation are global, but the perceived costs are local, particu-
larly due to land-use restrictions. The economic losses imposed on states
could therefore be, at least partially, offset by this new source of revenue.
In 2009, a few months before the UNFCCC COP 15, the governors of all
nine Amazonia states met and wrote a letter to the president, pointing
out that Brazil was lagging behind other developing countries in the car-
bon market. They argued that if Brazil was to receive more funds from
carbon credits and to reduce its own carbon emissions, REDD mecha-
nisms had to be included in the international carbon market under the
UNFCCC (Toni, 2011).
The Amazon Fund was launched as a means to obtain funding from
donors to ﬁnance the Plan of Action for Protection and Control of Defor-
estation in the Legal Amazon. The Amazon Fund was created within the
Brazilian National Bank of Social and Economic Development (BNDES).
The mobilization of civil society, particularly international NGOs8 and
other environmentalists since the 1990s, and the engagement of politi-
cians at the state and federal levels have been important for the
advancement of REDD-like ideas based on assumptions of the efﬁciency
of economic payments for environmental services to curb deforestation
(Hall, 2011). These ideas are also supported by several governors in the
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Brazilian Amazon and coincide with those of the president and the min-
ister of the environment, contributing to create conditions necessary for
the Brazilian involvement in REDD. For the Amazon Fund, the govern-
ment of Brazil pledged to allocate US$500 million, but it is estimated
that an additional investment of US$1 billion per year would be required
to fully implement the plan (Meyer, 2010).
Brazil has the technical capacity to monitor changes in forest cover
through remote-sensing technology and to ensure transparency to deal
with the fund through institutional structures and mechanisms. By
2008, Brazil had already put in place some of the conditions to be
enabled by Phase 1. This in part explains Norway’s support of the
Amazon Fund, which placed Brazil in phases 2 and 3. The Norwegian
support of the Fund is contingent on demonstrating avoided defor-
estation against a historical baseline (results-based payments). Norway’s
involvement is also based on ideas of economic rationality, altruism and
self-interest9 as a humanitarian/environmental protection actor.
The establishment of the Brazilian Amazon Fund can be explained
by the combined effect of the activities and initiatives of NGOs, state
governors in the Amazon region, and politicians in key positions (the
president and the minister of the environment). Norwegian support
through Norway’s International Forest and Climate Initiative (NIFCI)
gave the scheme the ﬁnal thrust to get the fund started. The Amazon
Fund is important for advancing the Brazilian approach to REDD. This
approach is well established in existing Brazilian institutions and is in
accord with the country’s views and priorities.
Brazil’s REDD strategy has been characterized by a strong involvement
of the central government, but NGOs and lower levels of the public
administration have also played a role. The advanced technical capacity
of Brazil in terms of remote-sensing and the establishment of a historical
baseline of forest cover place the country in a privileged position in
regard to the phased approach promoted at the international level. The
alliance of Brazil and Norway for ﬁnancing the Amazon Fund has given
Brazil’s strategy a very advantageous starting point.
Brazil’s approach to ﬁnancing REDD efforts has been based on the idea
of a centralized fund that would allow the country to avoid the volun-
tary carbon market for ﬁnancing reduced deforestation. However, the
growing involvements of other networks, particularly those in which
governors of the Amazon states are involved, have pushed the coun-
try towards additional mechanisms for ﬁnancing avoided deforestation,
particularly through their partnership with the governors of California
and Illinois.10
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In the following subsection we present the accommodating strat-
egy, which is used by most countries in the Latin American region
as mentioned above. To illustrate we use the cases of Colombia and
Costa Rica.
The accommodating strategy: Colombia and Costa Rica
REDD preparation activities in Costa Rica and Colombia have advanced
quite differently from those in Brazil. Colombia has the most decen-
tralized public administration in Latin America. Over 40% of total
government spending is allocated by subnational governments against
an average of 15% in the rest of Latin America (Alesina, Carrasquilla
and Echavarria, 2005). The administration of forest and other natural
resources is also decentralized (Alvarez, 2003). Costa Rica, on the other
hand, represents a case of highly centralized forest governance. We will
ﬁrst describe Colombia and subsequently Costa Rica.
The lead for the REDD process in Colombia has been taken by the pri-
vate sector, particularly business-friendly international NGOs (BINGOs),
and not by the central government. Colombia has one of the most
decentralized environmental administrations in Latin America. Local
environmental authorities (Regional Autonomous Corporations (CARs))
are in charge of the management and administration of all natural
resources and environmental issues in the area of their jurisdiction.
Although CARs receive a portion of their budget from the central
government, they also generate income through tax revenues that come
from projects implemented in their jurisdiction. In this way CARs
hold signiﬁcant power to decide the direction of both environmental
conservation and development projects.
The Colombian Government highlights the involvement of the pri-
vate sector in the ﬁnancing of environmental conservation efforts in
various white papers (e.g. the National Strategic Plan for Green Markets
produced by the Ministry of the Environment and the National Devel-
opment Plan 2005–2010). A general perception from the Colombian
Government is that private investments with little state regulation in
remote forest regions are more economically efﬁcient because they lower
their intervention costs and could also offer better-adapted development
options. A quote from an ofﬁcial of the Ministry of the Environment
illustrates the position:
The market in a way takes care of redistributing the resources at local
levels. It is a lot simpler . . . it lower our costs . . . so, if the state does not
receive the [REDD] money it does not need to invest in the regions
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where they are receiving the money . . .well that is good . . . the gov-
ernment does not need to invest in those regions; in a way they take
care of themselves.
All BINGOs operating in Colombia and some local NGOs expressed the
same view during our interviews; they too want to increasingly involve
private funds in current forestry and development mechanisms.
Within this context, REDD preparations have been largely led by
NGOs. The BINGOs working in the country (WWF, Conservation Inter-
national (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC)),11 in collaboration with
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
one local NGO/consulting ﬁrm (Corporación Ecoversa), created the
Colombia REDD Table in 2008 (Mesa REDD-Colombia). Other pri-
vate organizations (the Fund for Environmental Action and Children
(FAAN), the Natural Patrimony Fund and the Nature Foundation) as
well as the Ministry of the Environment and the Institute for Environ-
mental and Meteorological Studies (IDEAM) joined the Colombia REDD
table a year after its creation. Participation in the REDD table was not
open to all those who were interested. Instead, the control of certain
resources (i.e. knowledge, networks and technologies) legitimate and
facilitate their participation. Civil society organizations, universities and
others who are not considered “REDD experts” by the terms established
by the REDD table are excluded.
The REDD table in Colombia has positioned itself as a legitimate net-
work to be consulted or to provide inputs on various REDD-related
issues. For instance, the funds provided by the FCPF for REDD prepa-
ration activities are administrated on behalf of the government by an
NGO (FAAN). The REDD table is the most active and important network
that disseminates information concerning REDD in Colombia and that
reports to the World Bank.12
The Colombia REDD table strongly supports the inclusion of car-
bon markets in the mechanisms to ﬁnance REDD. This has also been
the position of Colombia in the international climate negotiations, in
which it has insisted on countries’ freedom to choose between different
ﬁnancial sources, markets and/or an international fund. The voluntary
carbon market is a salient project among members of the Colombia
REDD table, partially due to the engagement of international and some
local NGOs with actors interested in, connected to or involved with
the carbon business. These actors include the local public environmen-
tal authorities (CARs), national and international business partners (i.e.
mining and energy-producing companies, plantation companies, forest
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companies, carbon-marketing companies), international research orga-
nizations, development cooperation agencies, and indigenous and Afro-
Colombian leaders. These engagements would allow the channelling of
funds from a range of private businesses directly into carbon-market
projects that could eventually become part of REDD.
The REDD programme in Costa Rica is seen as a means to strengthen
and broaden the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) programme.
PES emerged in Costa Rica in the 1990s as a response to the perceived
problem of deforestation and forest loss. Between 1986 and 1991, the
country lost 4.2% of forest cover per year (Sanchez-Azofeifa, Harriss and
Skole, 2001), suggesting that Costa Rica had one of the highest defor-
estation rates in the world. The launching of REDD occurred ten years
after Costa Rica became the ﬁrst country in the world to establish a
system of PES in 1997. The ﬁnancial structure of the Costa Rican PES
programme is a hybrid of market-like mechanisms, subsidies and state
regulations. This is evident in the way that the programme is funded:
while it receives 3.5% of the revenues from a tax on fossil fuels, it
also depends on loans from the World Bank, from a series of grants
from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), from NGOs, from con-
tracts with national companies (Pagiola, 2008) and from international
governments. The German Government, through the German Recon-
struction Credit Institution (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)),
provided US$12 million for a ﬁve-year contract in 2007, and in 1996,
Norway bought 200,000 tonnes of carbon-emission reduction credits
for US$10 per tonne (Russo and Candela, 2006). The REDD national
strategy is being discussed within the framework of the national PES
programme. Because the current PES programme is unable to cover the
demand for payments for environmental services, which is very high,
REDD is seen as an avenue to increase the coverage of the national PES.
Costa Rica applied to the FCPF in 2008 to fund the REDD readiness
preparations.13 A grant was approved in 2010. In Costa Rica, public insti-
tutions are leading the REDD readiness preparations. The PES experience
and Fondo Nacional de Finaniciamiento Forestal (FONAFIFO) largely
shape the REDD process. FONAFIFO’s board of directors is the REDD
coordinating entity in Costa Rica. The board will include one represen-
tative from indigenous people’s organizations and one representative
from civil society.
FONAFIFO carried out a series of dissemination and outreach activ-
ities to engage with different stakeholder groups. As for indigenous
peoples, it has invited the Indigenous Integral Development Associa-
tions (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígenas (ADIIs)) to participate
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in information meetings and activities. Indigenous leaders contest the
legitimacy of the ADIIs in representing indigenous peoples. In 1982, in
an effort to make the indigenous territories legible to the state (cf. Scott,
1998), the Government of Costa Rica established the ADIIs as the legal
representative bodies of indigenous peoples.
To carry out PES in indigenous territories, the government designated
the ADIIs as the collective representative institutions of indigenous
peoples vis-à-vis FONAFIFO. The ADIIs became responsible for distribut-
ing the beneﬁts from PES in indigenous territories and for helping
FONAFIFO to implement PES in the indigenous resguardos. Currently,
indigenous leaders challenge this decision, arguing that the ADIIs are
ofﬁcial government bodies that “represent” and govern each indigenous
territory by law, but do not necessarily represent or respect traditional
ways of organization and are not accountable to indigenous peoples.
FONAFIFO carried out a series of early information dissemination work-
shops and it has engaged in an initial dialogue about the REDD process
with a range of stakeholder groups, and with indigenous peoples in the
Atlantic and Paciﬁc areas through the structure of the ADIIs.
Costa Rica recognizes carbon, insofar as it is considered an environ-
mental service, as property of the landowner, by law. The country has
chosen a national approach to reduced emissions accounting and the
development of a national baseline for avoided deforestation. At the
international level, Costa Rica, similar to Colombia, advocates for a mix
of funding for REDD. The approach in Costa Rica is towards a central-
ized REDD programme. In Colombia, on the other hand, the approach
is towards a decentralized system. These two different approaches reﬂect
the way in which forest governance is understood in the two countries.
In the following subsection we will analyse the third and last strategy,
using Bolivia as the example.
The resisting strategy: Bolivia
Bolivia has resisted REDD as part of carbon markets and offsets, based
on the idea of environmental justice and the non-commodiﬁcation
of nature. The current Bolivian position on REDD was ﬁrst commu-
nicated in a letter to the General Assembly of the United Nations in
2008, emphasizing “direct compensation from developed to develop-
ing countries, through a sovereign implementation that ensures broad
participation of local communities . . . ”. In its second communication
to the UNFCCC in 2009, Bolivia stated that the country did not sup-
port carbon markets “or the possibility of developing new ﬂexibility
in this area”, and called for domestic action for emissions reduction,
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under the argument that the “carbon market allows developed countries
to continue to pollute at home while developing countries face unfair
restrictions”.
The position was not a complete rejection of REDD but rather an
attempt to reshape it and to broaden the international perspective on
both forests and carbon. Different actors were involved in the planning
of a national joint programme in Bolivia, beginning in 2008, and Bolivia
was one of the ﬁrst pilot countries in the UN-REDD programme from
2009 onwards. A REDD team was set up in the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment (MAYA) as part of a larger national strategy for curbing defor-
estation (Estrategia Nacional de Bosque y Cambio Climatico, MAYA,
2009). The setting up of a national REDD programme was supported
by German (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ)) and Danish cooperation at the time, and a parallel process was
started with the FCPF of the World Bank. The UN-REDD programme
was presented for civil society actors in 2010, and four indigenous and
peasant organizations approved a capacity-building plan.
Beginning in 2010, different currents both inside and outside the
government caused confusion about the Bolivian position. At the Peo-
ple’s Conference for Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth
in Cochabamba in April 2010, where many Bolivian ofﬁcials also par-
ticipated, a declaration rejecting all forms of REDD/REDD+/REDD++
was presented.14 Following the conference, the negotiation team from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with representatives from the Unidad de
Madre Tierra) brought the Cochabamba position to the climate negoti-
ations in Cancun as promised, while the Ministry of the Environment
signed off on the UN-REDD programme on the condition that UN-REDD
would respect the Bolivian position against carbon markets.15 The col-
laboration with the World Bank was halted, and Bolivia never handed
in a signed version of the formal document Readiness Plan Idea Notes
(R-PIN).
The confusion and lack of advancement of the UN-REDD programme
in the 2008–2011 period also opened up the arena for private actors and
NGOs to get involved in REDD-like activities. Local communities have
reported that private actors (represented by NGOs, a Santa Cruz-based
company and local businessmen) contacted communities, asking them
to sign “REDD contracts” that involved the lease of land for 90–100
years, in exchange for untouched conservation areas and the “selling of
oxygen”. The government later stopped the attempts.
In 2008 the national NGO Friends of Nature Foundation (FAN), with
support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, set up an
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indigenous REDD project in the Amazon (Beni Department). The gov-
ernment, originally a partner in the project, withdrew in 2010. Several
regional and local indigenous organizations also withdrew, making the
argument that the NGO would have too much power over the project
and the resources involved. Furthermore, the local communities par-
ticipating in the project rejected the component regarding quantifying
emissions reductions, and the project was left only with select compo-
nents that addressed sustainable forest management, the enforcement
of Brazil nut collection and enhanced control of the area against illegal
logging. The project was in operation until 2012.
Later in 2011, a conﬂict between the central government and the low-
land indigenous organization Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de
Bolivia (CIDOB) over a road-building project through the national park
TIPNIS led to a rupture in contact among the ministries, public agen-
cies and the indigenous organization, hampering the possibilities for
further dialogue about the UN-REDD project. The plan for initiating the
participatory planning process for the UN-REDD programme was set on
hold. Meanwhile, CIDOB called for direct REDD funding to indigenous
areas and for the self-management of funds.
A parallel process was started in 2011 to develop a mechanism for
the sustainable management of forests, and joint climate-change mitiga-
tion and adaptation efforts. The process involved a number of national
NGOs, academics and public entities, such as the Authority for For-
est and Land (ABT), the National Institute for Agricultural Innovation
(Iniaf) and the Forest Directorate in MAYA. Bolivia hoped that the mech-
anism could be supported through an alternative REDD scheme outside
the carbon market. The mechanism was included in the Law of Mother
Earth in 2012, with an emphasis on holistic management of the forests.
A team was set up to facilitate the exchange of information and meet-
ing arenas. As public entities had poor ofﬁcial records of deforestation
in Bolivia, the participation of the NGOs (e.g. FAN) with such expertise
was crucial for the team. Former ofﬁcials, the Noel Kempff Museum of
Natural History and representatives from research institutions and social
organizations contributed with important experience and information,
forming a ﬁnal project document that was presented to the UN-REDD
in 2012.
In 2011, Bolivia informed the policy board of the UN-REDD pro-
gramme about its desire to modify its original National Programme
document. Two contradictory communications, which were sent from
Bolivian ofﬁcials to the policy board in December 2011 and March 2012,
led the board to freeze the funds and send a high-level mission to Bolivia
Mariel Aguilar-Støen, Fabiano Toni and Cecilie Hirsch 221
in June 2012. The mission concluded that there were several challenges
concerning the mechanism (e.g. the lack of an incentive system based
on veriﬁed reductions of emissions, the targeting of drivers, and the lack
of full participation from the indigenous organization CIDOB in the
making of the mechanism) and that the project was not eligible for full
ﬁnancing by the UN-REDD programme. Later, contrasting declarations
about the participation of indigenous organizations in the making of
the mechanism were also communicated to the UN-REDD policy board.
The mission ﬁnally recommended that the National Joint Programme
be implemented in its original form, and that it neither be redrafted
nor replaced with the new Bolivian mechanism. Bolivia agreed to con-
tinue with the programme, and a small part of the UN-REDD ﬁnancing
was channelled to the mechanism (such as the register of all forest
initiatives, forest inventory and the mapping of land-use change).16
The proposal for an alternative mechanism was marginalized by pow-
erful REDD donor countries in the international negotiations, claiming
it would lead to the fragmentation of the REDD project. Finally, in 2013,
Denmark, Switzerland and the EU granted support of over US$43 mil-
lion to the Bolivian mechanism. At the international level, Bolivia has
worked insistently with the inclusion of non-market-based approaches,
such as joint mitigation and adaptation – methodological issues related
to non-carbon beneﬁts – and it continues with its strong opposition to
carbon-market mechanisms.
Due to opposing currents both within and outside the Bolivian Gov-
ernment, different actors in Bolivia have pursued slightly different
strategies to inﬂuence and shape REDD, from complete rejection to the
reshaping of the initiatives, locally, nationally and internationally. How-
ever, the rejection of carbon markets has been a common position across
the majority of actors involved, as well as the integration of indige-
nous rights and the recognition of different functions of the forests. The
role of indigenous organizations and indigenous autonomy is still to be
deﬁned in the Bolivian mechanism, along with clear strategies to work
with the drivers of deforestation.
In the following section, we shift our focus to analyse ongoing
efforts at local and national levels. We will focus on demonstration and
readiness activities, and the actors involved in them.
REDD projects in Latin America
An important component of the planning phase of REDD is
demonstration and readiness activities. These are projects implemented
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at the local level to test the options available for countries and com-
munities. REDD projects can be seen as a means to understand how
REDD will unfold on the ground; REDD demonstration activities are
seen as means to learn lessons for future REDD implementation. These
early implementation projects inﬂuence debates about REDD, the ways
in which so-called co-beneﬁts are being addressed, and who is involved
and who beneﬁts from REDD.
In principle, REDD country strategies to be deﬁned in Phase 1 are
the ﬁrst step in the implementation of REDD national policies. National
REDD strategies would deﬁne the current situation in each country and
the direction in which the country is going to move in terms of reduced
carbon emissions from deforestation, addressing so-called co-beneﬁts
and deﬁning who would beneﬁt from economic payments. In practice,
however, numerous REDD projects are taking place before the design
of a country’s REDD strategy is ﬁnished or in parallel with its develop-
ment. Early implementation projects are informing the policy-making
process in each country and at the global level. Proponents of REDD
projects stand in a better position than other actors, who do not have
any experience with such projects, to inﬂuence REDD debates because
not having knowledge about REDD is a barrier for being included in the
ofﬁcial debates.
We have identiﬁed three approaches employed by actors involved in
early REDD planning, implementation and readiness projects, and the
consequences of such approaches. The ﬁrst one is knowledge production
and dissemination. Second is the creation of technologies or standards
to legitimize or validate projects. The third approach is enrolment in
new, emerging or alternative networks. In what follows we analyse these
three approaches by highlighting who is involved, the resources mobi-
lized to employ each approach, and the outcome. It is worth saying that
these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and different actors within
each country put distinct emphasis on each of these approaches.
Creation of knowledge and dissemination of information
Our ﬁndings indicate that, to a great degree, networks involving NGOs
and international research institutions with support from development
cooperation agencies and private actors are creating and disseminating
knowledge about REDD in the region. These networks systematize infor-
mation about REDD in Latin America and at the global level. They are
having a great inﬂuence in deﬁning what a REDD project is, who the
legitimate implementers are, who will beneﬁt from it and how. The
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the NGO Global
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Canopy Programme,17 and the voluntary REDD database18 created at
the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference in 2010 produce compilations
and databases that include all types of REDD-like projects.
The majority of REDD projects are being initiated or planned by pri-
vate actors in private lands, including national and international private
companies, and local and international NGOs (WWF, CI, WCS, TNC,
IUCN and Rainforest Alliance). In some cases, pilot projects are executed
with the participation of state governments in coalition with BINGOs.
Fair-trade cooperatives, carbon certiﬁers and research institutions are
also involved in pilot projects. Pilot project proponents act as de facto
researchers, testing REDD implementation modalities, and producing
information and knowledge about the projects.
As for funding sources for the projects, development cooperation
aid money, particularly from Norway and Germany, as well as private
funds, is the most important source. But here it is necessary to explain
in more detail what types of private fund are involved. The range is
wide and includes (1) direct investments in particular projects from
investors from the USA, Europe, China and India; (2) direct invest-
ments from companies (e.g. the largest Brazilian mining company, Vale);
(3) investments that private companies make in BINGOs; and, simi-
larly, (4) partnerships between local NGOs and private companies as
part of their CSR portfolio; (5) a plethora of alliances among domes-
tic NGOs and local-level environmental authorities (CARs), national
and international business partners (mining and energy-producing com-
panies, plantation companies, forest companies and carbon-marketing
companies), international research organizations, development cooper-
ation agencies and indigenous leaders.19 These alliances inﬂuence the
emphasis given to particular components in the projects.
The outcome of this approach is that private actors and research insti-
tutions, which are often international organizations, are creating knowl-
edge and disseminating information about REDD in Latin America. The
consequence of this is that these actors position themselves better than
public institutions or national research centres and have better resources
to inﬂuence the international debate. Even Bolivia, with a government
strongly sceptical about NGOs, saw the need to include these actors
as they have better forest data (e.g. maps) than the government. The
way in which they gain this privileged position is by accessing funding
from private sources or international development cooperation agen-
cies, coupled with the privileged position in neoliberal environmental
governance that they have maintained since the 1990s. To overcome
complex issues such as those related to ownership of the land, most
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projects are initiated or planned on private lands. In the following
subsection, we focus on measurements to validate REDD projects.
Measures to validate projects
NGOs, corporations and research institutions are involved in creating
standards to certify carbon offsets that can be traded in the volun-
tary carbon market or in a future REDD carbon market. Organizations
involved in pilot projects are also creating standards to demonstrate how
they involve local populations in REDD projects.
An illustrative example of this is the Rainforest StandardTM (RST).
This was developed by Columbia University in New York in collab-
oration with private environmental funds from Bolivia, Peru, Brazil,
Ecuador and Colombia. According to its proponents, “this standard inte-
grates carbon-accounting, socio-cultural/socio-economic impacts and
biodiversity outcomes into one single REDD standard20”. Projects cer-
tiﬁed with Royal Forest Society (RFS) can be registered in the Climate
Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)21 and in the Veriﬁed
Carbon Standards (VCS),22 to be traded in the voluntary carbon market.
The alliances and associations built among NGOs, the private sector
and research institutions contribute to the creation of facts, standards,
knowledge and concepts seen as accepted “truths” (cf. Goldman and
Turner, 2012). These accepted truths are shaping the direction of REDD
in the Amazon basin before governments have managed to put a plan
of action into place. For example, in Colombia, where the readiness pro-
cess is still incipient, BINGOs and local NGOs managed to include the
RST as a standard to certify REDD projects by the government in the
national REDD strategy. Projects that do not comply with the RST will
not be included in the national REDD register of Colombia, and their
proponents will not be invited to participate in the debate.
In the following subsection, we focus on alternative channels that dif-
ferent actors are using to engage in REDD. These are particularly relevant
in creating a counterbalance to mainstream views and values.
Alternative channels
REDD networks as described above, in which BINGOs and local NGOs,
development cooperation agencies, private actors, government agencies
and research institutions participate, are channels where REDD knowl-
edge is being produced and circulated. Such networks have a form of
agency in the creation of environmental knowledge that is validated
and re-enforced at different levels. Access to REDD networks is not open
to all of those who could be interested or affected by REDD policies and
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projects. Participation in REDD networks is conditioned by overriding
narratives on deforestation and by the role of monetary incentives in
tackling deforestation (see Forsyth, 2003). Activists seeking to inﬂuence
existing networks may have to decide between working within such
dominant rules and establishing alternative and competing networks
(Forsyth, 2003; Taylor, 2012). In this way, networks become important
resources to advance alternative views and values.
Initially, indigenous peoples were sceptical about REDD and rejected
carbon markets because they did not consider them to be offering real
solutions to climate change (see the Anchorage declaration adopted
by the participants at the indigenous people’s global summit on cli-
mate change in 2009).23 Indigenous organizations in the global South
criticize carbon markets and carbon-sequestration projects for their
oversimpliﬁed portrayal of ecosystems and forests, and for ignoring
the socioeconomic, political and institutional implications of carbon
sequestration for indigenous peoples.
Indigenous people’s organizations in Latin America, and particularly
in the Amazon basin countries, have since engaged in existing net-
works that support REDD, or in alternative networks that are sceptical
about REDD and carbon markets. The different paths taken by differ-
ent indigenous people’s organizations are in part explained by previous
engagements with other organizations and by their own experiences
with REDD. Indigenous people’s organizations’ choice of position is also
inﬂuenced by their experiences of negotiating with their governments,
and the organization’s own visions and priorities.
During the 12th session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indige-
nous Peoples in 2013, indigenous people’s organizations presented two
opposing views on REDD, later communicated at COP19 in Warsaw.
Some organizations oppose REDD on the grounds that it weakens exist-
ing national legal frameworks to protect indigenous people’s rights,
particularly in regard to territorial and collective land rights, consul-
tation and autonomy, and their opposition to carbon markets and
the commodiﬁcation and fragmentation of nature. Other organiza-
tions look at REDD as an opportunity to strengthen the land rights of
indigenous peoples and their local management, and to control their
territories with the help of direct funding.
The experience of some indigenous people’s organizations with
so-called “carbon cowboys”, particularly in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia
and Colombia, has made them extremely aware of some of the
risks that REDD projects might entail. Peruvian, Brazilian, Bolivian
and Colombian indigenous organizations denounced the fact that
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indigenous leaders signed disadvantageous contracts with private com-
panies. On the other hand, some groups are already developing long-
term land-use plans that involve REDD mechanisms deﬁned in their
own terms. That is the case of the Suruí in Brazil (Toni, 2011).
The Suruí live in a 247,000 Ha reserve in the state of Rondonia, and
93% of their land is still preserved (Suruí, 2009). The Suruí population
was 5,000 people when they ﬁrst made contact with non-indigenous
Brazilians, but currently only about 1,000 individuals live inside their
lands or in the nearby cities. During the 1980s an intense migration of
non-indigenous people to the Western Amazonia took place. By the end
of that decade, the population had decreased to roughly 250 members.
Despite this drastic reduction of their population, the Suruí started to
organize themselves in the 1980s. They created the Metareilá Suruí Asso-
ciation in 1989 to defend and preserve the Suruí’s cultural and territorial
patrimony.
In 2000, Metareilá started a participatory diagnosis to assess the poten-
tial of the Suruís and their territory. Based on this diagnosis, it designed
a plan for the use of the territory for coffee cultivation (one of the crops
introduced to their land by the invaders), for the management of Brazil
nuts, and for the restoration of areas degraded by illegal logging.
With the support of other NGOs (Associação de Defesa Etnoambiental
Kanindé, Amazon Conservation Team, Forest Trends, Idesam), the Suruís
decided to set aside 13,575.3 Ha of forests for 30 years, which will avoid
emissions that average 7,423,806.2 tonnes of CO2. The project was val-
idated in conformance with the Climate, Community and Biodiversity
Standards in 2012 (RA-VAL-CCB) and with the Veriﬁed Carbon Standard
in 2013. Despite the broad alliance that prepared the project, Metareilá
has full rights over carbon credits and will be the sole recipient of the
ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
The design of the Suruí Carbon Project included an extensive con-
sultation process, training for community members, development of
a baseline for carbon accounting, and analysis of the legal framework
regarding indigenous peoples and forest carbon. The Suruís initiated this
process in accordance with their own demands; they saw the sale of car-
bon credits as an opportunity to complement a long-term plan for the
development of their community.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at different strategies employed by Latin
American countries and actors in their meeting with the global forest
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and climate initiative, REDD, from resistance to accommodating to
assertive strategies. Brazil has been one of the major actors in the ini-
tiative after it changed its strategy from resistance to a more offensive
approach and managed to align REDD with its own domestic interests.
A strong actor such as Brazil has the resources, knowledge and power
to shape REDD in its interests, and with the focus on results-based pay-
ments, the country is in a privileged position. It has also succeeded in
sovereignty issues in international negotiations, such as those related
to monitoring, reporting and veriﬁcation/national forest monitoring
systems.
The experiences of the countries that have followed the accommodat-
ing strategy show how the history of environmental governance in each
country affects the implementation of the REDD initiative. Colombia
has, to a large extent, left the initiative in the hands of private actors
and local authorities, while Costa Rica has applied a model of “hybrid”
governance and a centralized REDD programme. Bolivia has stood out
in Latin America as one of the ﬁercest opponents of carbon markets,
something that has affected its possibilities and willingness to take part
in the initiative. Bolivia’s commitment to the inclusion of civil society
demands in environmental governance and the anti-commodiﬁcation
rhetoric has formed its responses to the global initiative. However, there
are divergent opinions, especially among the indigenous organizations,
about the right path to follow. Indigenous organizations with recog-
nized titles to their land believe that REDD can bring new opportunities.
However, although Bolivia’s position has been similar to that of Brazil
to a large extent, with national sovereignty and opposition to offsets as
focal points, Bolivia has instead been seen as the “activist state” that is
trying to fragment REDD. It was not until 2013 that Bolivia won support
for its alternative mechanism to forest and climate efforts.
These three strategies illustrate how the “black-boxing” of REDD
has allowed for the emergence of quite different hybrid models of
negotiating environmental governance at the international level.
Our research reveals that there is a constellation of actors shaping the
direction of REDD+ in Latin America. That constellation varies from
country to country and includes among others, donors, BINGOs and
national NGOs, research institutions, and in some cases different levels
of government. Through their engagements in networks that promote
and advance a narrative in which markets and monetary compensations
offer the solution to deforestation, these actors are in a privileged posi-
tion to participate in the co-production of knowledge and policy, and to
advance their agendas.
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For some governments, engaging in REDD – at least at the discur-
sive level – does not conﬂict with their priorities in other sectors,
such as oil exploitation, soy expansion, the expansion of large-scale
cattle-ranching, and mining and infrastructure development, which all
represent threats to the forests and further deforestation. REDD is seen
as an alternative that will allow for the ending of trade-offs between
forest conservation, poverty alleviation and economic development.
A good example of how this change is unfolding can be found in
the partnership between Norway and Brazil. Thanks to REDD, Brazil
became the largest receiver of Norwegian development cooperation aid,
which is an enormous paradox given that Brazil is one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world. At the same time, but not necessarily
as a consequence of such collaboration, Brazil has drastically decreased
deforestation in the Amazon.
NGOs have the technical and rhetorical expertise to participate in
negotiations in national and international arenas. They also have con-
nections with farmers, indigenous and traditional populations, govern-
ment ofﬁcials and bureaucrats. That makes them a privileged set of
boundary organizations (Guston, 2001) that can help to break resistance
against REDD and to open channels for the implementation of pilot
projects. They have been particularly strengthened by REDD due to this
role. They are becoming knowledge-providers to governments, donors
and local organizations, which has opened the doors for them to policy-
making forums. Environmental NGOs are now in a better position to
offer business alternatives to corporations and other private actors. Aside
from their role as boundary organizations, they are also brokers in REDD
implementation and have a direct stake in the negotiations.
The black-boxing of REDD has allowed for the construction of a large
and diverse network that supports the initiative. The widespread ques-
tioning of the market premises of REDD has led to a broadening of the
concept to accommodate disparate interests, ideologies and represen-
tations of what forests are and why they should be conserved. That
is why countries that have been vocal against REDD, such as Brazil
until the mid-2000s, are engaging in REDD preparedness. Accordingly,
some groups that initially opposed the mechanism, such as indigenous
populations, have pilot projects in their lands as REDD might offer an
alternative to strengthen their land rights. However, many indigenous
organizations remain critical of carbon markets.
The way in which REDD is going to be ﬁnanced is still an open ques-
tion. Although it was born as a market mechanism to trade carbon,
political mobilization from different actors has resulted in discussions
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that challenge the market orientation of REDD, and many actors in the
Latin American region advocate for a global public fund to ﬁnance the
initiative. The political opposition of several actors in Latin America has
also resulted in a broadening of the focus of REDD to multiple aspects
of forests and their related environmental services. In some countries, at
the domestic level, it is increasingly assuming the format of a public pol-
icy, whereas in the global arena it resembles what Angelsen (2013) has
called a “performance-based aid” mechanism. This means that develop-
ment cooperation funds are used to ﬁnance REDD on the condition that
countries demonstrate that they achieve certain levels of performance in
terms of reduced deforestation.
Notes
1. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf. See also Angelsen
et al. (2009: 3).
2. The ﬁnal Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) was never signed by the Bolivian
authorities.
3. http://www.lcds.gov.gy.
4. Other donors contributing to UN-REDD are, in order of the size of their
contribution, the EU, Denmark, Spain, Japan and Luxembourg. Germany
provides 34% of the total budget of the FCPF. Other donors include
Australia, the UK, the USA, Canada, the European Commission, the Nature
Conservancy and two private companies: BP Technology Ventures, an
alternative energy company with venture investments in projects speciﬁc
to biofuels, wind and solar energy; and CDC Climat, a company that
includes emissions trading and energy investments in its portfolio. The
other contributors to the Amazon Fund are Germany and the Brazilian






5. See Readiness Preparation Plans of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana and
Suriname.
6. In addition to the four BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and
China), representatives from Argentina, Fiji (as chair of the G77 and China),
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela were at the BASIC meeting. http://www.
twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130904.html
7. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America is a regional orga-
nization launched in 2004 and is made up of eight countries: Antigua and
Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
8. Brazilian environmentalists and NGOs (Instituto Socio Ambiental (ISA),
Greenpeace, Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental
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da Amazonia (IPAM), TNC, CI, Amigos da Terra Amazonia Brasileira
(AdT), Instituto do Homen e Medio Ambiente (IMAZON) and WWF-Brazil)
launched the Zero Deforestation Campaign. This was based on ideas of
strengthening the participation of state governments in forest governance,
payments for environmental services, strengthening of protected areas and
support for indigenous peoples.
9. According to the former Norwegian oil and energy minister Terje Riis-
Johansen, the allocation of Norwegian money to the Amazon Fund con-
tributes to opening doors for the Norwegian oil industry in Brazil. Paradox-
ically, thanks to the commitment to the Amazon Fund, Brazil – one of the
largest and fastest-growing economies in the world – has since 2009 become
the largest recipient of Norwegian foreign development aid. http://www.dn.
no/energi/article1975276.ece « rainforest millions open oil doors ».
10. The Governors Climate and Forest Task Force (GCFT) brings together
subnational-level authorities from Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, coun-
tries in Africa, and the governors’ ofﬁces of California and Illinois. In this
project, California and Illinois will potentially be able to purchase carbon
offsets from projects in developing countries, as part of the cap-and-trade
programme of these states, which will use a market-based mechanism to
reduce greenhouse gases. The GCFT receives funding from the Gordon
and Betty Moore Foundation, ClimateWorks, the Climate and Land Use
Alliance, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), and
the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. Collaborating partners include
NGOs from Brazil (Institute for the Conservation and Sustainable Develop-
ment of Amazonas -DESAM and Amazon Environmental Research Institute –
IPAM), Indonesia (Kemitraan), Mexico (ProNatura), a transnational private
company (ClimateFocus), and the US-based private research organizations
the Carnegie Institution for Science and the Woods Hole Research Center.
11. WWF, CI, TNC.
12. See the report of the due diligence mission of the World Bank to Colombia,
15–27 January and 22–23 March 2012. http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/2012/04/16508452/colombia-fcpf-redd-readiness-project-aide-
memoire-april-18th-25th-2012
13. In addition to the FCPF, other sources of funding include GIZ through
the REDD-CCAD-GIZ programme, which has ﬁnanced different activities in
Costa Rica with special emphasis on forest reference level; the Norwegian
development agency (Norad); and USAID.
14. Later it turned out that the Bolivian ofﬁcials were against the total rejection
of REDD.
15. The UN-REDD team respected the Bolivian position at the time and said they
would not intervene in the funding for the Bolivian programme.
16. In total, US$1.4 million. Source: Diego Pacheco.
17. The REDD desk is funded by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the
Climate and Land Use Alliance, the Department of Climate Change and
Energy Efﬁciency of the Australian Government, GIZ and USAID.
18. http://reddplusdatabase.org.
19. Interview FAN; interviews Colombia.
20. http://cees.columbia.edu/the-rainforest-standard and interview FAN.
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21. The CCBA is a partnership between research institutions (CATIE, CIFOR, and
ICRAF), corporations (the Blue Moon Fund, The Kraft Fund, BP, Hyundai,
Intel, SC Johnson, Sustainable Forestry Management, and Weyerhaeuser)
and NGOs (CARE, CI, TNC, the Rainforest Alliance and WCS).
22. The VCS was established in 2005 by the Climate Group, the Interna-
tional Trading Association and the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development. It is one of the world’s most widely used carbon-accounting
standards. Projects across the world have issued more than 100 million car-
bon credits using VCS standards. VCS headquarters are in Washington, DC,
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